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
A MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF US NATIONAL SECURITY
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
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
A MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF US NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY

BY

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STUDY ADVISER

MAY 1983



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

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Para 20. ABSTRACT Continued

that is not just based on military strength but considers, up-front, the political, economic, socio-cultural and technological elements in developing an understandable and implementable national strategy.

The Study set forth a model for the development of national security strategy that enables the following:

-- Place national goals and interest as the focal point for all supporting strategies.

-- Display all the elements of power on the same plane, with objectives, steps and means aimed at the same national security goal, allowing for the assessment of direction, trade-offs, risks, impact and implications in a systematic manner.

-- Allow for adapting it (model) to national or grand, regional, country, or issue strategy as well as to a plan, program or budget process,

-- Improvement in the quality of US national security strategy when the contest for world influence is becoming more zealous, thereby increasing the odds of success.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

A MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF US NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

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May 1983

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ABSTRACT

AUTHORS: Arnold T. Rossi, COL, FA; John E. Robbins, LTC, FA; John P. Stewart, COL, FA, Study Adviser.

TITLE: A Model for the Development of US National Security Strategy

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The process for developing U. S. national security strategy does not consider the nation's full spectrum of power. Only military strength is offered as the national security element through which the nation's security interests are upheld.

This process may have been the optimum in an era when U. S. military power was preeminent. But the conditions of the 1980s - -

- the change in military balance,
- the expanding Soviet influence in Central America, Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan and Vietnam,
- the declining effectiveness of nuclear deterrence,
- the broadening of the range for the strategy of deterrence,
- the overlapping US-Allied (interests) and Soviet interests,

demand a new look, a new strategy that is not just based on military strength but considers, up-front, the political, economic, socio-cultural and sci-technological elements in developing an understandable and implementable strategy.

The model for the development of national security strategy proposed:

- Places national goals and interest as the focal point for all supporting strategies.
- Displays all the elements of power on the same plane, with objectives, steps and means aimed at the same national security goal; allowing for the assessment of direction, trade-offs, risks, impact and implications in a systematic manner.
- Allows for adapting it (model) to national or grand, regional, country, or issue strategy as well as to a plan, program or budget process. And most important of all...
- will improve the quality of US national security strategy, when the contest for world influence is becoming more zealous, thereby increasing the odds of success.

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A

T A B A

PRELUDE

Can the U.S. regain the buoyant optimism of the 50's and 60's and shed the disillusionment of the 70's? The answer may well be a pragmatic no, but our argument is--The United States in the 1980's must regain the national will to deal with its role as leader of the world's Democracies and reduce the uncertainties in its content with Marxist/Leninism. Confidence must be restored; a national consensus can and must be rebuilt; a sense of purpose can be achieved. The problems of the decade (80's) are interrelated; no problem can be resolved in isolation; and different perspectives can contribute to a clearer, more balanced and understandable strategy. The process for the development of national security strategy we propose supports this. The precepts used in arriving at what is proposed were generally as follows:

- o From the numerous lectures and readings on national security strategy, we concluded that there was not a process or model or prescribed method for developing national security strategy which considered the nation's full spectrum of power. Rather, it appeared obvious that only military strength was used as the element. There is little or no evidence that political, economic, socio-cultural, sci-technological elements are ever considered in developing national security strategy. Nuclear deterrence; escalation control; mutual assured destruction; strategic stability; flexible response; counterinsurgency; limited nuclear war; conventional war; arms control are all concepts and ideas or "strategies" of an era when U.S. military power was preeminent. Many have dubious relevance to the conditions of the 1980's.

o U.S. national security is not just a matter of military strength but of an understandable and implementable strategy. Understandable to Americans, Allies, and and Friends. Security cannot continue to rely on numbers alone--defense policy today is unsuitable for today's complex world. It (security strategy) must be based on the ability to outwit opponents using every element of national power.

o In developing security strategy, the U.S. and Allies must have a clear understanding of the opponent's interests and perspective of the conditions in the world. Determine where and when the contest is and determine interests (goals) with specific objectives, steps and means arrived at meeting them (goals).

The methodology used in arriving at the process/model/method for developing U.S. national security strategy was as follows:

o Prepare a "strawman" proposal outlining goals, objectives, rationale, alternative strategy and model.

o Discuss the "strawman" proposal with prominent scholars, agencies, schools or centers for strategic studies.

o Revise the "strawman" according to input received from scholars, strategy centers and contemporary publications, incorporating observations, corrections, graphics, and wording which contributed to a clearer, more

balanced and understandable model for developing U.S. national security strategy.

The 1980's will stress that there are indeed realistic limits to America's ability to solve all problems.

- o American economic strength in relation to the rest of the industrialized nations has declined, while theirs has increased.

- o Soviet influence in nations and regions far from its borders has increased.

- o Soviet military strength continuous while U.S.-Allied military strength has declined.

- o Nuclear superiority has been replaced by, at best, nuclear parity, complicating deterrence of non-nuclear war.

- o Technology has become a double edged sword. All these developments clearly warrant the defense build-up accelerated by the Reagan Administration. But they also require something other than money and weapons. They require new ideas--a new security strategy process calculating risks, costs, impacts and results a little better than how we do it today.

Together with American Allies and friendly nations most problems can be solved. The "strawman" model we propose will be a mechanism for improving the quality of U.S. national security strategy.

B

T A B B


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FROM NUMEROUS LECTURES BY RENOWNED "EXPERTS" ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND MANY ACCOMPANYING READINGS - SOME OF WHICH ARE LISTED IN THE GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THIS REPORT - WE HAVE CONFIRMED OUR SUSPICIONS: THAT THE U.S., OR I SHOULD SAY, THAT GROUP OF AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, DO NOT HAVE A MODEL OR PRESCRIBED PROCESS OR METHOD FOR DEVELOPING IT (STRATEGY) WHICH CONSIDERS AND EMPLOYS THE NATION'S FULL SPECTRUM OF POWER. RATHER, THE STRATEGY DEVELOPED IS REACTIVE TO A SITUATION, CRISIS OR COMPETITION WOVEN INTO AN UNPREDICTABLE PATTERN.

THE "STRATEGIES" OF THE PAST ERA, WHEN U.S. MILITARY POWER WAS PREEMINENT, MAY NOT BE RELEVANT TO THE CONDITIONS OF THE 1980s. MILITARY STRENGTH ALONE MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT.

U.S. STRATEGY MUST BE BASED ON THE ABILITY TO OUTWIT OPPONENTS USING EVERY ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER, INSTEAD OF SIMPLY OUTPRODUCING AND OUTDEVELOPING THEM.

may '93



- COL A.T. ROSSI
- LTC J.E. ROBBINS
- ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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SLIDE 1

THE GOAL IS TO IMPROVE THE ODDS OF WINNING IN THE CONTEST WITH MARXIST/LENINISM OR THE SOVIET LED BLOC, AS THE POWER WHICH LOOKS AT THE WORLD AND HOW IT SHOULD BE DIFFERENT THAN WHAT THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES BELIEVE.

THE OBJECTIVE IS NOT NEW IN INTENT BUT THIS "STRAWMAN" INCLUDES NOT JUST THE MILITARY ELEMENT OF POWER BUT THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIO-CULTURAL AND SCI-TECHNOLOGICAL ELEMENTS WHICH, IF PROPERLY APPLIED WILL IMPROVE THE ODDS OF WINNING IN A CONTEST WITH MARXIST/LENINISM.

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IMPROVE the odds of winning in the
Contest with MARXIST/LENINISM



OBJECTIVE

DEVELOP METHODS

For improving the Quality

OF US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

BY Examining the Full range of Factors --
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, SOCIO-CULTURAL,
SCI-TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY -- AFFECTING
DEMOCRACIES VERSUS MARXIST/LENINISM competition.

SLIDE 2


THE IMPLICATION IN THE STATED GOAL IS THAT THERE IS A CONTEST GOING ON IN THE WORLD AND THAT THE CONTEST IS BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES LEAD BY THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES AND MARXIST/LENINISM LED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

THAT THE CONTEST IS IN FACT OVER WORLD INFLUENCE, AND THE OUTCOME IS SURVIVAL OF EITHER A DEMOCRATIC IDEAL OR A MARXIST/LENINIST IDEAL.

THE GRAPHIC HOWEVER IS INTENDED TO PORTRAY A WORLD WHICH OTHER NATIONS OR THIRD WORLD IS ALTERING AND INFLUENCING THE CONTEST AND THE IDEALS. IN SOME RESPECTS CAPITALISM IS SNEAKING INTO MARXIST/LENINISM WHILE SOCIALISM IS ENTERING DEMOCRACIES.

THE WORLD IS NOT BI-POLAR BUT MULTI-POLAR.

THE PROSPECTS ARE QUITE GOOD THAT THE PRESSURES OF THE OTHER NATIONS OF THE WORLD ON THE TWO SUPER POWERS WILL HAVE A DRAMATIC INFLUENCE ON THE OUTCOME TO THE CONTEST.



SLIDE 3

THEN WHAT DO WE DO?

WE NEED AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY - ONE WHICH INCLUDES ALL THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER WITH SUPPORTING REGIONAL OR COUNTRY STRATEGIES WHICH ARE IN SYNC WITH NATIONAL GOALS AND INTERESTS.

WE NEED AN ACTIVE STRATEGY. ONE THAT DOES NOT WAIT FOR A CRISIS TO DEVELOP THEN CREATE A STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH IT WHEN CONDITIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO MIRROR THOSE ON WHICH THE REACTIVE STRATEGY WAS DEVELOPED.

WE NEED A CALCULATING STRATEGY. BY THAT I MEAN, ONE WHICH WE CAN BETTER ESTIMATE RISKS, TRADE-OFFS, COSTS, AND RESULTS. ONE WHICH WILL REDUCE UNCERTAINTY AND ANXIETY, ALTHOUGH REALISTICALLY NEVER ELIMINATING THEM.

BEFORE WE PROCEED ON THIS EFFORT, WE -- THOSE U.S. AND ALLIED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY -- NEED TO:

- REALIZE WHO ARE OUR ADVERSARIES, AND UNDERSTAND THEIR UNCOMPROMIZING GOALS.
- ONCE WE UNDERSTAND WHO AND WHAT THEY ARE AFTER, WE MUST UNDERTAKE A SUSTAINED EFFORT TO PROTECT U.S.-ALLIED AND FRIENDLY NATION'S COMMON INTERESTS.
- CONTINUE TO BASE OUR SECURITY STRATEGY ON DETERRING THE USE OF FORCE. BUT, IF PETERRENCE FAILS HAVE THE ABILITY TO EMPLOY MILITARY POWER SUCCESSFULLY AND PRESERVE THE IDEAL.

NEED ...

• integrated strategy • synchronized supporting strategies

NEED ...

• active strategy (calculating)

reduce anxiety & uncertainty

vice

reactive strategy (non-calculating)

NEED ...

1. To realize we face uncompromizing adversaries with goals incompatible with our own.
2. To undertake a sustained effort to increase the ability of the US and its Allies to protect our common interests.
3. To deter the use of force by an adversary.
4. To have the ability to employ force successfully if deterrence fails.

SLIDE 4

IF WE ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THERE IS A CONTEST GOING ON IN THE WORD: AND THAT THIS CONTEST IS FOR WORLD INFLUENCE; AND THAT THE PRINCIPAL OPPONENT TO THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IS MARXIST/LENINISM LEAD BY THE SOVIET UNION, THEN IT SEEMS PROPER THAT BEFORE WE BEGIN TO DEVELOP A MODEL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, THAT WE ATTEMPT TO KNOW OUR OPPONENT'S VIEWS AND MINDSETS.

THE FIRST CHECK-MARK IS INTENDED TO PORTRAY HOW THE SOVIET UNION VIEWS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. ACTUALLY, NOT UNLIKE HOW THE US MAY VIEW SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY! THE POINT IS THAT THE MAJOR ELEMENTS CONSIDERED ARE KEPT IN BALANCE TO PRODUCE THE MOST FAVORABLE POLICY FOR THE PROPONENT. A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF HOW THE U.S. HAS APPLIED FOREIGN POLICY LATER.

SECOND, THAT THE DANGER OF CONFRONTATION IS VERY REAL BECAUSE THE OPPONENT'S POLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE WORLD ARE IN CONFLICT WITH U.S.-ALLIED INTERESTS. AND.....

THIRD, THIS DANGER OF CONFRONTATION OR THIS CONTEST WILL EXIST AS LONG AS DEMOCRACIES AND MARXIST/LENINISM EXIST. IN OTHER WORDS, WE ARE IN THIS CONTEST FOR THE LONG HAWL.

OPONENT'S PERSPECTIVE

Seems proper that we attempt to know their views & mindsets

- ✓ USSR views US Foreign policy as a balancing act.



- ✓ Danger of confrontation is rooted in Fundamental clash of vital political interests.
- ✓ This clash or contest will be present as long as the two opposing camps exist.

SLIDE 5

TO BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND OUR OPPONENT IT IS WORTHWHILE TO ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND, IN VERY BASIC TERMS, HOW THE SOVIETS LOOK AT THE WORLD. A PRISM IS USED TO ILLUSTRATE THAT, AS FAR AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, IT VIEWS THE WORLD IN A LAYERED FASHION WITH THE POLITICAL ELEMENT, THE FIRST AND MOST DOMINANT; WHILE THE U.S. VIEW IS THROUGH A PRISM COMPOSED OF THE SAME ELEMENTS BUT WHEN VIEWING THE WORLD LOOK AT IT THROUGH EACH ELEMENT AS THOUGH LIGHT AND COLOR WAS KEPT SEPARATE ONE FROM THE OTHER.

THE SOVIET MINDSET IS DESCRIBED IN THE EQUATION OF -RUSSIAN TRADITIONAL INFLUENCES, ITS CULTURE, NATIONAL VALUES, ETC., PLUS MARXIST IDEOLOGY AS INTERPRETED BY LENIN, PLUS CLAUSEWITZIAN DOCTRINE OF 'WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY,' MULTIPLIED BY THE MANNER AND WAYS IN WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE PRACTICED POLITICS - OR THE RUSSIAN WAY OF POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY. EMPHASIS, WEIGHT AND VALUE OF EACH PART OF THE EQUATION DEPENDS ON THE SITUATION, THE PLAYERS AND THE STRENGTH OF THE LEADERSHIP.

OPONENT'S PERSPECTIVE contd ...

✓ Soviet view of the world thru prism ... US view...



✓ Soviet MINDSET = (Russian Tradition & Marxist/
Leninist Ideology &
Clausewitzian Doctrine) *
Realpolitik

SLIDE 6

SOME IN THE WEST MAY FEEL THAT THE VIEW OF THE INEVITABLE VICTORY OF MARXIST/LENINISM HAS BEEN OVERCOME BY THE MODERN SHAPE OF EVENTS, BUT IMPRINTED DEEP IN THE SOVIET CONSCIENCE IS A BELIEF THAT THEIR IDEAL IS INEVITABLE. AS MANY SOVIET LEADERS HAVE SAID AND WRITTEN - IT IS THE LAW OF HISTORY.

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE IS THE SOVIET BELIEF THAT THE CORRELATION OF FORCES OR ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER ARE SHIFTING IN THEIR FAVOR. BUT.....

THERE DOES NOW EXIST AN APPROXIMATE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE U.S.-ALLIES AND THE SOVIET BLOC DESPITE U.S. RETHORIC TO THE CONTRARY.

OPONENT'S PERSPECTIVE Cont'd

✓ Soviet conviction - the inevitable victory of Marxist/Leninism because of historical inevitability - the Law of History.

✓ Overall correlation of Forces is shifting in their (Soviet) favor.

BUT

✓ There exists an approximate military balance between the US-Allies and the Soviet Bloc, in the contemporary world.


SLIDE 7

AND BECAUSE OF THIS SOVIET PERCEPTION OF AN APPROXIMATE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, THE MILITARY ELEMENT PLAYS A UNIQUE ROLE IN SHIFTING THE CORRELATION OF FORCES. THIS UNIQUE ROLE IS EXPLAINED IN THE GRAPHICAL EQUATION: - THE SOVIETS VIEW AS CRITICAL TO CONTEMPORARY WORLD ORDER. THAT IS, BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN UNANSWERED NUCLEAR STRIKE AND THE MEANS ARE NOT YET EVIDENT TO PREVENT AN ANSWER OR DEFEND FROM SUCH A STRIKE, PARITY IS CRITICAL... THAT IS MILITARY PARITY IS CRITICAL: THAT A SUDDEN SHIFT IN THE MILITARY ELEMENT OF THE CORRELATION OF FORCES EQUALS DANGER. DANGER IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SANCTIONS AIMED AT CHOKING MARXIST/LENINISM AND DANGER THAT A NUCLEAR STRIKE WILL INFLICT HEAVY, IRREPARABLE DAMAGE.

THE NEXT GRAPHIC IS INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE NOT ONLY HOW THE SOVIETS SEE THE MANNER IN WHICH THE U.S. HAS BEEN CONDUCTING ITS FOREIGN POLICY, BUT JUST ABOUT HOW THE U.S. HAS CONDUCTED ITS FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PAST TWENTY YEARS.

THE SLIDING BALLS REPRESENTS AT WHICH POINT OF THE EXTREMES THE U.S. APPLIES ITS POLICY. THE PRESENT LOCATION OF THE BALLS DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY U.S. ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION BUT IS SIMPLY ILLUSTRATIVE. AN EXAMPLE MAY BE THE U.S. SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF POLAND IN THEIR STRUGGLE TO GAIN SOME FREEDOMS THUS MOVING THE BALL IN THE DIRECTION OF SUPPORTING FREEDOM OF PEOPLES, WHILE IN EL SALVADOR THE SOVIETS WOULD INTERPRET U.S. POLICY AS HAVING MOVED THE BALL IN THE DIRECTION OF SUPPRESSING LIBERATION.

✓ Military Factors play a unique role in shifting the correlation of forces.



✓ US Foreign policy has been a struggle of trends ...

Freedom of peoples	← ● →	Suppress Liberation
Curb arms	← ● →	Boast Arms
Peace	← ● →	Threats
Detente	← ● →	Cold war
Sovereign rights	← ● →	Interference

SLIDE 8

THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE WORLD SEES EMERGING "IMPERIALIST THREATS."

- U.S. SUPPORT OF PACT NATION "DISSIDENTS."
- U.S. FEELING THAT IT NEEDS TO REGAIN WORLD RESPECT AFTER ITS LOSS IN VIETNAM.
- HIS FRIENDLY GESTURES PACKED BY INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS AND EVEN SOME MILITARY ASSISTANCE TOWARD CHINA MAKES THE SOVIETS EXTREMELY NERVOUS. US GESTURES COUPLED WITH CLOSER TIES BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN INCREASES THE SOVIET TRADITIONAL FEAR OF ENCIRCLEMENT.
- NATO'S GENUINE MODERNIZATION EFFORT - ESPECIALLY THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND THE GROUND BASED CRUISE MISSILES - ARE VIEWED AS THAT SUDDEN SHIFT IN THE MILITARY CORRELATION OF FORCES DESCRIBED AS DANGEROUS EARLIER.
- AND EMBRACING ALL OF THESE SOVIET IMPRESSIONS IS AN HISTORIC FEAR OF ENCIRCLEMENT. OF BEING BOXED IN AS IF THE U.S. IS AGITATING THEIR DISEASE OF CLAUSTROPHOBIA.

THEN YOU THROW IN WHAT THE SOVIETS REGARD AS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COURSE OF CONFRONTATIONISM AS OPPOSED TO HIS PREDECESSORS' RESTRAINED COURSE, SUBSTANTIATED BY.....

THE TWO SIDED ARROWS REPRESENT THE ARGUMENT OF WHETHER THESE INITIATIVES WILL LEAD TO AN ARMS RACE STRAINING NATIONAL RESOURCES OR ARMS REDUCTION.

OPPOSITION'S PERSPECTIVE cont'd

✓ Soviet view of emerging Imperialist Threats

PACT
LOYALTY

Post
Vietnam
"prestige
effort"

US-CHINA
Friendship
ties

NATO
strengthening
effort

"Fear of
Encirclement"

✓ Reagan course of CONFRONTATIONISM

From a RESTRAINED COURSE to:

ARMY RACE? ARMS REDUCTION?

- Openly CHALLENGING the shift in the correlation of Forces
- ATTACKING legitimate Soviet interests
- Adapting -
 - Broad missile supremacy program
 - Master plan for military superiority
 - Master plan for geo-political dominance.

SLIDE 2

FROM A US PERSPECTIVE, LETS TAKE A DIM GLIMPSE AT STRATEGIES WE HAVE APPLIED AND CONDITIONS WHICH MUST CAUSE A RELOOK AT PAST CONCEPTS, POLICIES OR STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY.

THE GRAPHIC REPRESENTS THE COMMONLY AND POPULARLY REFERRED-TO STRATEGIES OF THE ERA THROUGH THE 1970s AND CONDITIONS WHICH NOW DEMAND NEW CONCEPTS.

- MASSIVE RETALIATION WAS A STRATEGY THAT SUITED THE TIMES: THE U.S. ENJOYED NUCLEAR SUPREMACY: IT WAS CERTAINLY LESS RESOURCE INTENSIVE THAN DETERRENCE VIA LARGE CONVENTIONAL FORCES: AND THE OPPONENT'S CAPABILITY WAS QUITE LIMITED IN SCOPE.
- THE STRATEGY OF STABILIZING ANY CRISIS HAS FLOURISHED FOR A LONG LONG TIME AND REMAINS A CORNERSTONE OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.
- THE CONCEPT OF ESCALATION CONTROL BEGAN TO TAKE HOLD WHEN THE OPPONENT ACQUIRED MEANS TO ENGAGE IN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WAR.
- CONCURRENTLY, AS BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS ACQUIRED YET BETTER (MORE YIELD AND MORE ACCURACY) IN THEIR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION TOOK HOLD AND REMAINS A VIABLE STRATEGY....TO SOME.
- BUT THEN THE NUCLEAR BASED STRATEGIES DID NOT CONTAIN NOR PREVENT WARS. LIMITED WAR IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS, WARS OF INSURRECTION OR "NATIONAL LIBERATION" AND THE CONCEPT OF KEEPING A WAR BETWEEN MAJOR OPPONENTS LIMITED - THAT IS CONVENTIONAL - BECAME POPULAR AMONG MANY STRATEGISTS.

SLIDE 3 CONTN'D

- AND SO, TO BE ABLE TO MEET ANY AND ALL SUCH WARS, THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WAS BORN. IN SHORT, THIS STRATEGY IS AIMED AT HAVING THE MILITARY MEANS TO ENGAGE ANY FOE, ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, AT ANY LEVEL OF COMBAT INTENSITY. A MILITARY STRATEGY CONSIDERED TODAY AS A SECOND CORNERSTONE OF US NATIONAL SECURITY.

- THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CONCEPT IS A FORERUNNER OF THE U.S. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY APPLIED VISIBLY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA; SUFFERED IN POPULAR SUPPORT; AND CURRENTLY SEEING A MODERATE OR ATTEMPTED RE-BIRTH IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

WHILE THESE CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES WERE BEING DEVELOPED, APPLIED AND EVOLVED, WORLD CONDITIONS CHANGED.

- THE 1970s SAW U.S. ECONOMIC STRENGTH DECLINE AS COMPARED TO OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS OF THE WORLD SUCH AS THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (COMMON MARKET); JAPAN; AND THE OPEC OIL BROKERS.

- THE USSR'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND BLOC LOYALTY BUBBLED.


- SOVIET INFLUENCE INTO AFGHANISTAN, ETHIOPIA, YEMEN, ANGOLA, SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND CENTRAL AMERICA DEMONSTRATED THE USSR'S "IMPERIALISTIC" GOALS.

- SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH GREW.....

- WHILE U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH DECLINED.....THEN SAW A PLAN FOR REBUILDING OFFERED UNDER PRESIDENT CARTER AND EXPANDED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN.

US PERSPECTIVE (a dim glimpse)

Strategies and Conditions...



SLIDE 10

DESPITE THESE CONDITIONS.....EAST WEST STRATEGIC BALANCE IS IN CHECK.....
NOT CHECK MATE.....BUT IN CHECK. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT DETERRENCE HAS SO FAR
PREVENTED WAR BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER POWERS AND THEIR PRINCIPAL ALLIES. BUT THIS DOES NOT
DENY THE FACT THAT U.S.-ALLIED OPPONENTS HAVE NOT TRIED AND ARE CONTINUING TO TRY AND
ESTABLISH A WORLD ORDER OF MARXIST/LENINISM. IF THE RISK IS TOO GREAT THEN THE MEANS FOR
ATTAINING THE SAME ENDS ARE ALTERED.

THEN WHERE, IN WHAT ARENA, IS THE CONTEST CONTINUING? WE PROPOSE THAT THAT ARENA
OR AREA OF CONTEST IS THE THIRD WORLD. THE REASON FOR THE TWO DIAGONAL LINES THROUGH THE
WORD THIRD ON THE GRAPHIC IS THAT IT (THE CONTEST) IS NOT LIMITED TO WHAT HAS BEEN COMMONLY
REFERRED TO AS THE UNDERDEVELOPED OR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, BUT RATHER THE
REST OF THE WORLD - OTHER THAN U.S. AND SOVIET INFLUENCED NATIONS.

IF THE THIRD WORLD IS THE AREA OF CONTEST, THE U.S.-ALLIES NEED TO UNDERSTAND SOVIET
POLICIES TOWARD IT.

- SOVIET POLICIES HAVE BEEN CULTIVATED IN A WAVE OF ANTI-COLONIALISM.

US PERSPECTIVE contn'd ...

✓ East-West strategic balance in check?



✓ Then where is the contest?



✓ Soviet policies in 3rd World cultivated in a wave of anti-colonialism.

SLIDE 11


● SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD, NOT ONLY IN THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, HAS BEEN TO COMMUNIZE THEM. THEY WILL ACCEPT ISOLATION FROM WESTERN INFLUENCE; NEUTRAL STATUS; OR FINLANDIZATION APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF "THE ENEMIES OF MY ENEMIES ARE MY FRIENDS." WHILE.....

- SOVIET PRINCIPLES ARE AS DEPICTED IN THE PUZZLE WITH THREE DOMINANT:


1. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PREVAIL.....AS JUST DESCRIBED.
 2. USING ARMS AS A MEANS OF INFLUENCE.
 3. DON'T COMPROMISE ON STRATEGIC PURPOSE AND VALUES OF THE CONTESTED REGION.
- AS FAR AS THE PRINCIPLE OF BEING A "RELIABLE AND DEPENDABLE PROTECTOR" THERE IS SOME QUESTION AS TO ITS VALIDITY WHEN IT COMES TO COUNTRIES OR REGIONS NOT CONTIGUOUS TO SOVIET BORDERS. SOMALIA AND EGYPT ARE RECENT EXAMPLES.

US PERSPECTIVE cont'd ...

✓ Soviet strategic objective in the non-communist world is --



✓ Soviet principles in the 3rd world -



SLIDE 12

WHAT ABOUT THE U.S. AND THE THIRD WORLD IN THE 1980s? HOW AND WHY IS IT OF INTEREST TO THE U.S. AND ALLIES?

RAW MATERIALS, STRATEGIC MINERALS, MARKETS FOR GOODS.....ETC.....

THE THIRD WORLD THREATENS U.S. AND ALLIED INTERESTS GENERALLY IN THREE WAYS:

1. ATTACKING - MILITARILY, BY FORCE ALTHOUGH LIMITED BUT DISRUPTIVE - LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, SHIPPING, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL BASES AND MATERIALS CRITICAL TO THE CONTINUED PROSPERITY OF THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES.
2. THIRD WORLD COUNTRY LEANING TOWARD THE OPPONENT INCREASING HIS (OPPONENT'S) INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. AND.....
3. NATIONAL OR REGIONAL INSTABILITY CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE OPPONENT TO GAIN INFLUENCE.

THEREFORE, U.S.-ALLIED OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE TO ELIMINATE OR AT LEAST MINIMIZE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCH THREATS AND ADOPT A STRATEGY BASED ON SIX POINTS:


1. CONSERVE ENERGY BECAUSE THE PRINCIPAL LEVERAGE IN THE HANDS OF THESE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IS ENERGY PRODUCING RESOURCES.
2. STOCKPILE RESERVES OF CRITICAL MATERIALS AIMED AT

SLIDE 12 CONTN'D

3. REDUCING DEPENDENCE IN THE REGION. IN OTHER WORDS, REDUCING INTEREST.
4. ENCOURAGE THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING; PROVIDE FOR INTERNAL ECONOMIC AID TO FOSTER SELF-DEVELOPMENT.
5. COOPERATE IN THE DEFEAT OF COUPS OR ANY UNDEMOCRATIC MEANS TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS.
6. BE WISE ENOUGH TO POSITION ITSELF IF COUP SUCCEEDS.

US PERSPECTIVE cont'd...

✓ The US and the 3rd World in the 80s...



✓ A strategy to deal with above...

- Conserve energy
- Stockpile reserve
- Encourage steps to reduce coups
- Cooperate in defeat of coups
- Reduce dependence in region ∴ interest
- Position itself (us) if coup succeeds...


SLIDE 13

US NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS HAVE REMAINED BASICALLY TIED TO:

- PROTECT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
- KEEPING THE PEACE WITH FREEDOM INTACT.

EACH SUBSEQUENT CLOUD REPRESENTS AN ARTICULATION OF THE BASIC GOAL INTENDED TO EXPRESS MORE PRECISELY WHAT AND HOW.

US NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS



SLIDE 14

LIKEWISE, U.S. MILITARY OBJECTIVES AIMED AT SUPPORTING US NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS ARE IN TWO - LONG AND SHORT TERM.


IN THE LONG TERM, THE FIRST AND FOREMOST OBJECTIVE IS TO PREVENT THE OPPONENT FROM TAKING ANY MILITARY ACTION WHICH THREATENS YOUR INTERESTS. DETERRENCE HAS BEEN AND REMAINS AS THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES. BUT IF DETERRENCE IS TO BE CREDIBLE IT MUST HAVE AS A NATURAL FOLLOW-ON OBJECTIVE THE CAPABILITY TO STOP AN OPPONENT'S MILITARY FORCE WHICH THREATENS YOUR INTEREST ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT. THE U.S. ATTEMPT AT MEETING THESE LONG TERM OBJECTIVES ARE:

- A STRONG, FLEXIBLE CONTINENTAL MILITARY FORCE CAPABLE OF STRIKING, DEPLOYING AND FIGHTING ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD.
- PROJECT MILITARY POWER BY AIR AND SEA.
- MAINTAIN FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES IN REGIONS WHERE THE THREAT AND INTEREST PREVAIL.


IN THE SHORT TERM, THE FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO DETER ATTACK AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. AGAIN IT FOLLOWS QUITE NATURALLY THAT A MILITARY OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO ALSO DETER ATTACKS AGAINST THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND ALLIES WORLDWIDE, ESPECIALLY TO SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS AND THE ROUTES FOR TRANSPORTING THEM. THIRD, INSURE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE U.S. ALLIES AND FRIENDLY NATIONS. AND LASTLY, IF DETERRENCE FAILS, HAVE THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DEFEAT THE OPPONENT.

US MILITARY OBJECTIVES...

LONG TERM



SHORT TERM



SLIDE 15

NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES ARE NOT NEW. IN FACT, THEY HAVE EXISTED FOR THE MOST PART SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE MODERN ERA.

YES, STRATEGY, POLICY AND SHORT TERM MILITARY OBJECTIVES HAVE DETERRED GLOBAL WAR..... SO FAR. BUT.....THEY HAVE NOT BEEN AS SUCCESSFUL IN REDUCING THE RISKS AND THE CONTINUED WARS IN REGIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

SOVIET BLOC P FOUR, WHICH STANDS FOR THEIR PURPOSE, PERSISTENCE, PATIENCE AND POLITIKS COMBINED WITH U.S.-ALLIED V SQUARE, OR VARIANCE AND VACILLATION IN POLICY, STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES, MAY BE PERCEIVED BY EITHER OPPONENT AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. FROM U.S.-ALLIED PERSPECTIVE AS AN INFLEXIBLE AND CUMBERSOME SOVIET APPARATUS THAT WILL EVENTUALLY FALL OF ITS OWN WEIGHT: FROM A SOVIET PERSPECTIVE AS AN EROSION OF IDEALS AND RESOLVE.

IF YOU ACCEPT THIS CONDITION AS ONE WHICH WILL MAINTAIN THE STATUS-QUO AND/OR FAVOR DEMOCRACY, THEN.....

ACCEPT THE RISK. THE RISK THAT SOMEDAY THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES MAY FIND THEMSELVES IN A CONDITION -- ECONOMICALLY, MILITARILY, SCI-TECHNOLOGICALLY AND MAYBE EVEN SOCIALLY -- WHICH GRAVELY JEOPARDIZES ITS POLITICAL WELL-BEING.

GOALS and OBJECTIVES are NOT NEW

- Strategy, policy and short-term objectives have deterred global war ... so far.

BUT

- Soviet Bloc P^4 + US-Allied V^2 = Perceived Weakness

P^4 =
Purpose
Persistence
Potience
Politiks

inflexibility

V^2 =
Variance
Vacillation

Erosion of
ideals

OR

- US-Allies accept the risk May find themselves in a condition -- economically, militarily, sci-tech, socio-cultural -- which grossly jeopardizes their political well being.

SLIDE 16

THEN HOW SHOULD WE CHANGE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY?

DETENTE.....UNSUCCESSFUL WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE CONDITIONS THAT I DESCRIBED EARLIER.

COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIETS DOESN'T WORK, HAS NOT WORKED AND WILL NOT WORK.....
SOME SAY.

WESTERN EUROPE AND U.S. DISAGREE OVER DETENTE.

THEN WHAT IS AN ALTERNATIVE?

WE SAY.....US-ALLIED ARRANGEMENTS BASED ON A GENUINE COLLECTIVE, MUTUAL SECURITY
PACT IN WHICH WE SHARE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY BURDENS AND WHOSE GOAL IS.....

HOW SHOULD WE CHANGE OUR STRATEGY?

☑ Detente?

Some say unsuccessful

Cooperation with Soviets
doesn't work

Western Europe
and
US

disagree...

ALTERNATIVE?

☑ US-ALLIED ARRANGEMENTS?

• COOPERATIVE
• MUTUAL
• SECURITY

sharing

• ECONOMIC
• POLITICAL
• MILITARY

burdens

GOAL

over →

SLIDE 17

TO PREVENT.....

NOTE THAT THE GOAL IS FOCUSED ON MORE PRAGMATIC MATTERS AND NOT IDEALISTIC GOALS AS
"HEARTS AND MINDS....."

OR.....FACE.....

AGAIN NOTE THAT THE CONSEQUENCES ARE STATED FOR THE U.S. ONLY NOT ITS ALLIES. THE
REASON FOR THIS DISTINCTION IS THAT WITHOUT ALLIED SUPPORT -- ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND
MILITARY -- AIMED AT THE GOAL, THE TASK IS FAR TOO GREAT FOR THE U.S. TO DO IT ALONE AND
ALTHOUGH IT (U.S.) MAY BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO EXIST WITH CONTINENTAL FREEDOM IT WILL HAVE
LITTLE INFLUENCE ON WHAT HAPPENS IN THE REST OF THE WORLD. IN OTHER WORDS, ISOLATION IS
A STRATEGY OF ANOTHER ERA.

STRATEGY CONTIN'D...

- ☒ Prevent Soviet-Bloc from gaining control or influencing countries possessing the scarce economic resources upon which depend the prosperity and ultimately the political stability of the advanced industrial nations... and in turn the further development and prosperity of the rest of the world.

OR

- ☒ Face the consequence⁴ of a US gradually reduced to the status of an isolated power unable to play in global development.

SLIDE 18

THEN WHAT DO WE DO?

WE NEED AN UNDERSTANDABLE STRATEGY. IT MUST BE UNDERSTANDABLE NOT ONLY TO THE U.S. ALLIES AND FRIENDS - PARTICULARLY THE PEOPLES OF THOSE NATIONS. IF YOU CAN'T UNDERSTAND IT, IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT AND UNDOUBTEDLY LACK POPULAR SUPPORT.

OUR PROPOSAL IS A FIVE PART STRATEGY ARRANGED IN A MOSAIC AND WITH EMPHASIS AND FORCE ON THE FIRST WORD OF EACH PART.

- FOCUS ON BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH NATIONS WHO ARE INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING OR ADOPTING DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND IN FREE TRADE. NATIONAL OR REGIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM UNDERMINES WESTERN ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, POLITICAL STABILITY AND SUCCESS IN THE CONTEST WITH MARXIST/LENINISM.

- INVOLVE NATIONS WHOSE GEOPOLITICAL POSITION IS SUPPORTIVE TO U.S.-ALLIED INTERESTS. THAT IS, BRING ON BOARD EARLY ON SUCH NATIONS AS BRAZIL AND MEXICO IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: ISRAEL, TURKEY, SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT IN THE MIDDLE EAST; SPAIN AS AN ADJUNCT TO WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICAN INTERESTS; AND EVEN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL AND COUNTRY STRATEGIC GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.

- EMBRACE PACIFIC ALLIES SUCH AS JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, THAILAND. MAKE THEM FEEL CONTRIBUTORY TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL AND BY COUNTRY STRATEGY.

SLIDE 18 CONTN'D

- CULTIVATE NON-ALIGNED AND NEUTRAL NATIONS AS FRIENDS AND ALLIES. I MEAN, A WELL PLANNED AND EXECUTED CULTIVATION EFFORT. OF PARTICULAR EMPHASIS MUST BE SUB-SAHARA AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA WHILE STEPPING UP OUR EFFORTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

- AND FIFTH - UPHOLD NATO. STRENGTHEN IT. BUT STRESS TO ITS MEMBERS THAT NATO'S VIABILITY AS THE VANGUARD OF THE WESTERN IDEAL DEPENDS NOT ONLY ON WHAT HAPPENS IN WESTERN EUROPE, BUT ON WHAT HAPPENS IN THE REST OF THE WORLD.

IN OTHER WORDS, THE STRATEGY OUGHT TO BE AIMED SQUARELY AT PREVENTING MARXIST/LENINISM FROM AREAS OF THE WORLD VITAL TO THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF ALL NATIONS WHO ARE NOT NOW OR, FOR THOSE NATIONS THAT ARE BUT WHO DESIRE NOT TO BE, UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MARXIST/LENINISM.

MAYBE WE NEED AN UNDERSTANDABLE STRATEGY -
UNDERSTANDABLE TO AMERICANS, ALLIES AND FRIENDS ...

Focus on bilateral arrangements with nations who are interested in maintaining or adopting democratic principles and interested in FREE TRADE

Involve nations whose geopolitical position is supportive to US-Allied interests ... Brazil, Mexico, Israel, Turkey, S. Arabia, Spain, Japan, South Africa, Egypt

UPHOLD NATO, BUT STRESS ITS (NATO) VIABILITY (economic, political & military) by insisting on showing interest in the rest of the world ... especially the world's trading states

EMBRACE PACIFIC ALLIES ... Japan, S. Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand

Cultivate

NON-ALIGNED & NEUTRAL NATIONS AS FRIENDS
← allies ... particularly in South Asia, Africa & Latin America

" In other words ...

PREVENT SUCCESSFUL MARXIST/LENINIST GEOPOLITICAL THREATS INTO AREAS VITAL TO THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF THE NON-MARXIST/LENINIST WORLD.

SLIDE 19

THEN WHAT MODEL, OR PROCESS, OR METHOD DO WE USE TO DEVELOP SUCH A STRATEGY?
A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY THAT CONSIDERS UP-FRONT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER.

THE MODEL WE OFFER IS INTENDED TO:

1. ADAPT TO GOALS OR INTERESTS OF THE NATION AS ARTICULATED BY THE REPUBLIC AND WHICH NORMALLY TRANSCEND SEASONAL POLITICAL CHANGE, YET ALLOWS THE POLITICAL PROCESS TO PRESCRIBE OBJECTIVES, STEPS AND MEANS WHICH REFLECT THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. THAT THESE GOALS OR INTERESTS ARE NOT DEPENDENT ON EXISTING BUDGETARY PROCESSES SUCH AS PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM, OR THE CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION PROCESS, ALTHOUGH IN CONCERT WITH THEM.
2. DISPLAY ON THE SAME PLANE THE VARIOUS OBJECTIVES, STEPS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THEM (OBJECTIVES) AND THE MEANS TO CARRY OUT THE STEPS, ALL AIMED AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY GOAL OR INTEREST, FOR THE FIVE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER.
3. ALLOW FOR CROSS-CHECKING OBJECTIVES, STEPS AND MEANS AMONG THE FIVE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER TO INSURE MUTUAL SUPPORT AND/OR ASCERTAIN RISKS, IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS OF EACH IN AN ORIENTED FASHION.
4. ADAPT TO GLOBAL, REGIONAL, COUNTRY OR ISSUE FOR WHICH A NATIONAL SECURITY GOAL OR INTEREST IS PRONOUNCED.

OVER

SLIDE 19 CONTN'D

5. EXTEND THE MODEL AS IT BEST FITS THE PLAN, THE PROGRAM OR BUDGET OVER TIME.

ALTHOUGH THE ARTICULATION AND DISPLAY OF THE SPECIFIC STRATEGY MAY NOT CONFORM TO THE "WHIZ WHEEL" FORM, THE PARTS WILL REMAIN IN THE SAME RELATIONSHIP.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY STRATEGY NEEDS TO CONSIDER THE FIVE FACTORS WHICH BACK-UP THE ACTUAL OBJECTIVES, STEPS AND MEANS. THEY ARE - IN ORDER OF CONSIDERATION AND DEVELOPMENT:

1. AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREAT, THE OPPOSITION, THE OBSTACLE TO YOUR STATED GOAL OR INTEREST.
2. A COMPLETE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS FOCUSED ON DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS, AND CONFLICTS, AS WELL AS COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES.
3. LIKEWISE, A COMPLETE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS FOCUSED ON THE U.S. AS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF NATIONS.
4. SPECIFIC STEPS AND MEANS, ALTHOUGH RECOGNIZED ESSENTIAL, MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE WITHIN THE PLAN, PROGRAM OR BUDGET PERIOD. DO WE HAVE THE TECHNOLOGY, THE LABORATORIES, THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MEANS, THE INDUSTRIAL BASE, THE RAW MATERIALS AND THE SCIENTISTS? AND IF NOT TO ALL OR SOME, DETERMINE HOW AND HOW MUCH.


OVER

SLIDE 19 CONTN'D

5. WHEN ALL OF THESE HAVE BEEN DONE - PUT A PRICE ON IT. THE PRICE TAG MUST NOT BE NEAR-SIGHTED. IT MUST BE A TOTAL LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS - FROM WOMB TO TOMB. IT MUST INCLUDE A GOOD ESTIMATE OF OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COSTS: TRAINING OF INDIVIDUALS, CREWS AND UNITS: MANPOWER RELATED COSTS SUCH AS RECRUITMENT, PAY, AND BENEFITS: MOVEMENT, DEPLOYMENT OR TRANSPORT COSTS: IMPROVEMENT COSTS: AND ANY OTHER FUNCTIONALLY RELATED COSTS.

BY APPLYING THIS MODEL WE BELIEVE, THAT THE QUALITY OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY WILL IMPROVE AND INCREASE THE ODDS OF WINNING IN THE CONTEST WITH MARXIST/LENINISM.

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COUNTRY
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C

T A B C

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

(An account of observations offered by scholars and members of agencies recognized in the field of strategy, security and Soviet affairs.)

The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University,
Stanford, California 94305

Galoskoy, Constantin V. Research Fellow

Enthusiastic supporter and likes the concept. Agrees that today's method for developing U.S. national security strategy is reactive and out of sync with other national elements of policy. Offered assistance in development of actual strategy using the model proposed. Observations:

- o Suggested the graduation of the elements of national power depicted in the graphic of how the Soviets view the world: depicting each in a specific order and size.

- o Cautioned on the wording of that portion of the proposed strategy dealing with NATO. We should not give the impression that NATO has not contributed to the strength of the alliance.

Moore, John H. Associate Director and Senior Fellow, former National Fellow member. Presidential nominee to the National Science Board; member,

Board of Directors, Thomas Jefferson Center Foundation; member, Southern Economic Association; member, Western Economic Association; member, Board of Honorary Advisory Editors, South African Journal of Economics; member, Editorial Advisory Board, Fisher Institute; referee for articles submitted to Law and Policy Quarterly and Southern Economic Journal.

Generally in favor of the effort but cautiously pessimistic as to whether or not the model can be effectively adopted. Feels that any effort at establishing a systematic approach is a worthwhile effort. Observations:

- o Doubts USSR leadership believes in its ideology. Rather, ideology is used by the leadership to justify what they do for their own purposes.

- o What has happened in the world in the last 20 years is that the Russians have built up from an obvious inferiority as was shown during the Cuban Missile Crisis to at least parity. Along with this change has come a change in the world political climate which is an improvement in USSR influence, at least from their point of view. What they are able to achieve now politically in Europe, Asia, Africa and around the world has a lot to do with their military build-up. The further they go with their military build-up toward superiority the more political influence they will have on the world and the more they will be able to get what they want without using military power. That is one of the underlying purposes for what they are doing; therefore, parity is questionable. The USSR wants superiority not parity.

o Politically in the U.S., as well as other parts of the world, there has to be developed some way of justifying capitalism other than economics. There must be a moral justification. People will not defend materialism forever especially in a free market system where there are dispersions of income distribution. There are people that say what have I got to loose if this country is socialist or communist or whatever because I will probably be at least as well off as I am now. Unless we can appeal to these people in another way as to why it is better to be free than not to be free then we have a problem. We must have a reason to defend freedom.

o Getting agreements on goals that will last longer than two years will be difficult because of congressional changes and administration changes.

Drachkovitch, Milorad M. Senior Fellow and Director of Archives, member of the Committe for a Free World.

Although Dr. Drachkovitch did not offer specific observations to the many points in our "strawman," he did reinforce our motive for this effort. Particularly, Soviet perspective of the world and their relentless efforts to control it. Also the need for a new strategy, one which did not rely solely on the use of military power but rather a skillful manipulation of political, economic and technological power--along with military power--as the only reasonable approach to improve the odds of winning in a contest with Marxist/Leninism.

Conquest, Robert. Senior Research Fellow; Scholar-Curator of the Russian and East European Collection of the Hoover Institution; Advisory Council, Freedom House; member, Advisory Council, Institute for European Strategic and Political Studies.

Made numerous suggestions to the specific wording of many of the points in our "strawman" dealing with the opponent's perspective.

Specifically:

- o Soviet conviction--the inevitable victory of Marxist/Leninism because of "the law of history."
- o Soviets do not compromise on ideology.
- o Elaborated on the Soviet paranoia about "encirclement."
- o There are serious disagreements, especially among NATO members, about detente.

Beidman, Arnold. Professor; author; lecturer; newspaperman and foreign correspondent; founding member of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, D.C. and trustee of the Philadelphia Society.

Enthusiastic about the project we have undertaken: needed, essential, a must. He gave emphasis to the socio-cultural element of power as one desperately in need of redressing.

The Rand Corporation. 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90406

A detailed orientation and review of several projects on RAND's platter indirectly related to the "strawman" effort:

- o Rand Strategic Assessment Center Program is an attempt to use automation (computer programs) to ascertain the viability of contingency plans with built-in automated opponent response.

- o New NATO strategy assessment.

- o Demonstration of Strategic Warfare in the Ross Language (SWIRL) and Tactical Warfare in the Ross Language (TWIRL) and then application in counter command, control and communications.

Briefed an assembly of Rand management and research fellows on the model for the development of U.S. national security strategy. General observations were favorable and, as expected, offered assistance in further development and assessment of the strategy developed.

Center for Strategic and International Studies/Georgetown University,

1800 K. Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

Stein, Jonathan B., Research Associate in Energy Studies.

Supportive of the effort. Warns of the challenges posed by the Soviet energy situation and urges examination of specific policy issues by the West. In other words, in our model for developing national security strategy, the specific steps and means elected must support U.S.-Allied interest in retaining access to energy resources. Stein questions U.S. intelligence agencies' optimistic projections of Soviet energy capabilities and argues that such faulty assumptions could lead to poor decisions by the U.S. Inadequate energy to satisfy Soviet and Bloc consumption could lead to political unrest. Such a situation could prompt the USSR to lay claim to Middle East oil supplies.

Sabrosky, Alan Med. Senior Fellow, Political-Military Studies.

Extremely helpful and willingly assisted in a detailed refinement of the "strawman" proposal. Offered precise wording and meaning to many of the points made in the proposal.

- o Emphasized the need to have an active strategy.
- o Show the world as multi-polar--not just Democratic and Marxist/Leninism in the contest for the world.
- o Soviet mindset does include Clausewitzian doctrine.

Gong, Gerrit W. Research Associate.

Offered insights into the internal dynamics of Soviet Society and their implications for the West.

- o Uncertainty surrounds the ascendance of Yuri Andropov to the post of secretary general.

- o Although the USSR may decline internally, it does not mean that it is, as some Western observers may believe, on the verge of economic bankruptcy and political collapse.

- o Soviets face hard choices as they pursue their traditional economic objectives: Investment for economic growth, strengthening military power, and improving the lot of the consumer.

- o Soviet will be reluctant to surrender their current position in strategic arms.

Central Intelligence Agency, McLean, VA.

Hayman, Hans; Rutherford, Ben.

The general consensus offered by these members of "the agency" was-- that the model for the development of national security strategy is not needed. The rationale for this position was that U.S. strength lies in the fact that we develop strategy in a reactive mode; that we do not actively

plan for determining the future of other nations; that to develop a process for making so called grand strategy may be construed as having taken up the opponent's ways.

Congress of the United States, Washington, D.C.

Lind, Bill, Staffer, Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado)

Generally opposed to having an active strategy. Democratic process supports reactive form as more agile.

Gingrich, Newt, Representative (R-Georgia).

Offered the following:

o The real goals in America are free, prosperous and safe from threats, any threats. The largest threat is that of the Soviet Union, but it would be as big a disaster for Khomeini to have an H-bomb delivered by bus to New York City as it would be for the USSR to deliver it by SS 18.

o We have abstract longterm national goals that are independent of the existence of the Soviet Union. Start with the goals for the citizen, work up to the goals for the nation-state. The true test is--what are the positive national goals we should live by?

o There are two things to argue intellectually:

1. As a model, politics under Clausewitz starts with a vision, then goes to strategy, then to tactics. We must have a dynamic vision on what we are doing. We must have a Churchill and Roosevelt with a vision of the world in order to have a Gen Marshall working on a strategy. Visions need to be positive not negative.

2. We live in a culture dominated by the ideas and values of the liberal welfare state. We need a fundamental paradigm shift in the language we use and the way we think about things. It is the way we think that is killing us right now, not the way we act--we are acting out our thoughts.

o There are three major breakthroughs we need to make:

1. Improve the odds of freedom dominating the planet. We are for freedom dominating the planet - period. I would be glad if anyone on the left would say we are not. What does that mean? You are for tyranny. The fact that we are for freedom dominating the planet means by definition that we are a threat to the Soviet Union. As long as we are alive they are in trouble because people have a tendency to drift toward the highest possible values, in Maslow's sense of human values, and freedom is a better value than being a slave. We need to come back and redefine reality--we

need a section that says let us argue about reality here is a decision tree.

Why is it that leadership in the west has the enormous ability to forget the lessons of the past. Liberalism believe that there is no such thing as evil. Andropov is essentially the Himmler of the Soviet Union. He was precisely the same as the head of the Gestapo. We should be careful about dealing with such people.

Because we have lost the use of certain words, we forget their meaning. We must reestablish clarity in thinking--i.e. The definition of strategy states that it is integrated--therefore, we don't need an integrated strategy since it is already integrated.

2. Here is a shocking thought--in fact the Soviets are losing--there is only one thing which they are ahead in, and that is military. Now as it happens that is the most dangerous. Look around the world and there are Cuban troops guarding the Gulf Oil refinery in Angola and that should tell you something about which side is dominating. There is a Hungarian factory which makes blue jeans and pays royalties to an American Firm (Levi). Two years ago, the largest selling movie in Yugoslavia was Star Wars. We loose morale because we don't realize that it is not a juggernaut, it is just the opposite--it is dangerous because there is only one zone in which they can win the military zone.

3. The scale of change (according to Megatrend and Third Wave) that will likely hit the west in the coming years is so great that a totalitarian centralized state will not survive. It is very likely that we are about to see is the obsolescence of the Soviet system. If they don't move fast in the next 30 years, they will be the same as Ottoman Turkey was by 1900.

- o We are relatively less important than we were ten years ago and ten years from now we will be relatively less important than we are now.

- o Hans Mark argues that we have to accept the debipolarization of the world, relax, gradually pull out of Europe, accept the fact that we will be the largest single country in a world of large countries in terms of economics. If we established relations with West Europe, Japan, Brazil, China, etc. . . . we have a lot better capacity to survive in a world of turmoil than the Russians do. Militarily it is highly improbable that they would occupy Europe.

- o Prefers the thesis that we are by ourselves growing less important, relatively speaking, but take the zone from Tokyo to Berlin--we are a tremendous alliance. The problem is not for us to withdraw into traditional nation-state politics, but the problem is for us to move one to two magnitudes closer toward a more sophisticated genuine alliance team.

o We don't care about controlling nuclear arms, we care about controlling nuclear wars. Everybody focuses on the wrong half of the equation. We have a positive need to figure out how to save the Russians from getting desperate. We want to beat them, we want to seal them off, we want to let them decay--we want to ensure that they feel that they are never threatened enough that they think they have to launch an attack to survive. How do we do that--they fear First Strike because far more of their strategic weapons systems are vulnerable. Nobody in this country acknowledges that 80% of their systems are land based and all their submarines are vulnerable. We know our subs can kill their subs. You are in Andropov's shoes and you know both of these--you look at P-II systems with a seven minute delivery time--you have to wonder! We need to think how we back off from the First Strike environment on both sides. How do we make thresholds that make it less and less likely that we reach the point of August 1914? It is clearly not in our national interest to engage in a nuclear exchange. If we lose our top 20 cities, we clearly will not be the dominant power afterwards. We have to control crises and force structure in such a way as to avoid a nuclear exchange. We both have a vested interest in Brazil and China not dominating the world because of a nuclear exchange.

o There might be sufficient terror in nuclear weapons that either side might be willing to lose conventionally without resorting to nuclear weapons--similar to what happened with the Germans during WW II when they did not use chemicals on the Normandy invading forces.

o We are going to have a serious problem in the 21st Century on controlling the level of violence.

o One thing required is an American vision for the Third World. What do we stand for? How do we lead the Third World as opposed to protecting our interest? We favor justice whatever that is. We have to go back and favor justice actively. We are seen as an unjust society--how do we change that?

o Try to figure out a way to eliminate as a goal or objective--deterrence. Try to replace it with something positive. Foreign policy deters war--military policy wins wars.

o We do not have the erosion of democratic capitalism. In fact, over the past 35 years, capitalism has gained.

o Don't think our choices are detente versus Allies arrangements--the Soviet understanding of detente is far different than ours. We can go back to detente if we understand its meaning to the Soviets and are willing to match them in each level of escalation. Detente has never meant to the Soviets giving up competition.

o We have to change the alliance so fundamentally that it is better to talk about recreating the alliance. The old alliance is a coalition led by the U.S., not a partnership. It should have a blue water strategy.

The first thing we gain by being in Japan and Germany is that we keep the Russians out. The second thing is enormous amourpropre over those countries. It would be a lot more dangerous world without a quarter million Americans in Germany--it is not only protecting the Germans, it is protecting us. We are beyond the stage of being an isolated nation-state, we are tied in to the world economically.

Teller, Edward. Member, Federal Emergency Management Advisory Board; member, Advisory council to President's Reagan's Science Adviser; member, U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board; Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences; member, National Academy of Sciences; member, White House Science Council; fellow, American National Society; fellow, American Physical Society; member, Society of Engineering Sciences; fellow, American Association for the Advancement of Science; member, Geophysical Union; member, Committee of Protectors of Andrei Sakharov; member, International Academy of Quantum Molecular Science; member, Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy; member, Society of Engineering Scientists; recipient, American Academy of Achievement Gold Medal; recipient, Friends of Jerusalem College of Technology award for outstanding contribution to the advancement of science and technology; recipient, American Academy of Achievement Gold Medal award for extraordinary service to the Gold Plate Awards Council 1982; recipient, Lloyd Freeman Hunt Citizenship Award presented by the Heritage of Freedom Council, 1982; honorary trustee, Association for Unmanned Space Vehicles Systems; member, Board of Governors,

Council for National Policy; advisory board member, Technology in Society; special adviser, United States Congressional Advisory Board.

Dr. Teller's area of expertise and interest was in the development of "the means" for executing national security policy, recognizing that these "means" often dictate the strategy.

- o There is not a military balance between the U.S. and USSR. The USSR is ahead in everything we know of militarily. The U.S. is ahead in everything except military. But military is the most important of the elements of power. We are doing the same thing that we did prior to WW II. We are grossly underestimating how bad off we really are. There is not approximate balance of power between the U.S. and USSR.

- o There are three things that we must do immediately to recover from our present situation. They are:

1. The armed forces of this country must recognize the need for well educated scientists. In the past, scientists have not been promoted and have gotten out of the service. The officers who make four stars are politicians not scientists. The armed forces must have better relations with the scientific community. The Army must retain scientists by promoting them and giving them a chance.

2. We over-classify things. The USSR knows but the American people cannot know because of classification, i.e., there has been no effort on limiting the effects of EMP. American Industry must be brought in. If you classify--you must declassify soonest.

3. We (U.S.) cannot do it alone. We must recover with the assistance and cooperation of our Allies and Friends. Share the whole preparedness with everyone whose interests are the same as ours--South Africa, Taiwan, Israel, Japan, Western Europe. etc. Weapons must be directed against weapons not people.

The London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street,
London WC2A 2AE England

Lieven, Professor (referred to by Professor Leonard B. Shapiro, prominent world expert on Soviet Affairs).

Interested in our development and offered the following observations:

- o The existing Soviet regime is stable.
- o Russian power is maintained by military strength.
- o Muslims in the Soviet Union will become a real problem in the next 15-20 years.

o Russians are unable to influence people on their borders without use of military force.

o Since Khrushchev, USSR has not argued that they will win militarily but thru economic, political and ideological conviction.

Institute for the Study of Conflict. 12-12a Golden Square, London W1R
3AF, England

Goodwin, Michael. Director.

Gutteridge, William, Professor, Editorial Consultant.

Brenchley, Frank, Former Ambassador to Norway and Poland.

The trio offered most perceptive and supportive observations. Generally clarified Soviet intentions and perspectives with emphasis on ideology as a most influential element of their behavior. Particularly, addressed the condition of the correlation of forces as shifting in the Soviet favor. Also, Soviet views U.S. foreign policy as an effort to strangle the USSR. Regarding the "strawman's" suggested alternative strategy for NATO, they were apprehensive about expanding NATO's involvement in more areas of the world.

Elliot, Iaim, Editor, Soviet Analyst, London Times.

Receptive, understanding and in agreement for the need to have such a model. Particularly interested in the "strawman's" proposal to increase U.S. efforts in Africa and a look-back at what might have happened if the U.S. had such a "whiz wheel" model approach--things might have favored U.S.-Allied interests a bit more.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock Street,
London WC2E 7NQ, England.

Alford, J., Colonel, Deputy Director.

Offered the following:

- o Correlation of forces is shifting in their favor.
- o "Enemies of my enemies are my friends." Ideologically it is the march of history--they are only giving history a nudge.
- o The model is very similar to to the Marxist/Leninist model.

University of London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies,
Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E, England.

Watson, Hugh Seton, Professor.

After some preliminary skepticism expressed by Professor Watson regarding the use of "models," he became most helpful in offering several more descriptive observations about Soviet intentions and mindsets:

- o The Soviets feel they have to be able to fight at all levels of warfare--from bows and arrows as well as ICBMs.

- o If nuclear balance is maintained among opponents, the one (opponent) with the greatest mobility has a definite advantage. This is the reason Soviets have invested heavily in conventional forces, air and sea lift and particularly the expansion and capabilities of the Soviet Navy and the development of a large Merchant Marine.

- o Soviet expression of projection of power by showing their flag in far distant (from USSR) ports.

- o The most important element for the Soviets is "patience." They enjoy being bored, they expect to be bored and are therefore very, very patient.

- o We need to clarify or define what is meant by compromise. The West has interpreted Soviet behavior on issues which they appear to give in as a compromise. By definition, compromise means that there has been a mutual concession of differences when the facts are, as far as the Soviets are concerned, there has been a halt, even a temporary step back,

while the original objective remains unchanged. As the opportunity presents itself, they will continue toward the original objective.

Soviet Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst,
Camberley, Surry, England GU15 4PQ.

Vigor, Peter; Chojecki, N.; Orr, Michael.

There appeared to be some division of views among the tri-reviewers over several points regarding Soviet perspectives of the conditions of the world, their mindset and their views of the U.S. and Allies. Additionally, Dr. Vigor was very skeptical of any "model" or process or methodology, at the start of the discussion; however, he later concurred in the need for some system for developing an understandable national security strategy. The trio was particularly helpful in expanding the precise impact and implication of the "opponent's" perspectives. Many of the observations had already been offered by previous reviewers of the "strawman," but several are quite explicit and articulate points from slightly different position.

o Regarding the Soviet mindset, Dr. Vigor, felt that "Clausewitzian doctrine" did not go far enough in explaining that part of the equation. More precisely he offered the doctrines of Moltke and Schlieffen-The Prussian-German School. War is an instrument of policy, and although Moltke maintained that a commander should be free in the actual direction

of military operations, he admitted that fluctuating political aims and circumstances modified strategy. Mobilization and the initial concentration of forces are principles which were advocated by Moetke and are followed by the Soviet Forces. Schlieffen not only upheld technology but professed the concept of maneuver which Soviet forces aggressively pursue. Therefore the equation ought to reflect the Prussian-German doctrine as advanced by Moltke and Schlieffen.

- o The manner in which the Soviets look at the world is a prism composed of but three elements, political, economic and military in that order. Ideology is an integral part of political and sci-technology is part of the economic and military elements. The socio-cultural or tradition was not considered a significant element. However, Mr. Chojewski did not share this view. Rather, he was of the opinion that Russian tradition, or the socio-cultural element, played a key role in influencing Soviet behavior.

- o Soviet leadership is so insulated from its people that they do not realize the magnitude of "at-home" economic problems.

- o In their opinion, there is no evidence in current Soviet literature to support the "strawman's" contention that a Soviet view of emerging "imperialist threats" includes the U.S. post-Vietnam "prestige effort."

D

T A B D

CONCLUSIONS

o Our thesis--that a model/process/method for developing national security strategy considering the nation's full spectrum of national power does not exist--was soundly supported by all the scholars and agency representatives we conferred with.

o With the exception of several agents of the Central Intelligence Agency and one Congressional staffer, every scholar we conferred with concluded that a method or process is needed. As far as American strategy and national security policy are concerned, the changes of the 70's demand a new look, a new strategy primarily caused by these trends--

1. The change in the military balance--from American superiority to, strategic parity and conventional inferiority.

2. The development of the Soviet Empire. By the end of the 1970's the image of the Soviet Union may have withered in the face of their sustained military build-up and their active attempts to expand militarily its control and influence directly and through proxies in various parts of the world. Afghanistan, Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Vietnam, Nicaragua are developments which make it accurate and useful to picture the Soviet Union not as a revolutionary state nor a status-quo state, but rather as an imperial state.

3. The declining effectiveness of nuclear deterrence--coincident with the emergence of nuclear parity, the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent, which had originally served to deter a conventional Soviet invasion of Western Europe, and later expanded to perform a variety of other functions has become increasingly limited. In fact, strategic nuclear forces can deter only a narrow range of contingencies, although these contingencies may be considered more catastrophic. Yet . . .

4. The range of Soviet military actions that the United States and its Allies need to deter has expanded. Initially, it was primarily concerned with deterring an attack on Western Europe. Then the Korean War and Japan and Korea come under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But in the 70's, three more deterrent needs emerged. First, the protection of Persian Gulf oil from Soviet threats into a very politically unstable region--the "Carter Doctrine." Second, deterring a Soviet attack on China. Third, deter Soviet military action within "the Soviet sphere of influence"--Poland.

5. Factors likely to increase the probability of Soviet-American conflict in the 80's. First, the overall military balance is more favorable to the Soviets today than at any other time since World War II. Second, the area of potential overlap in conflicting interests and in the ability to apply military forces has increased--particularly on the Soviet side. Third, political instability and upheaval is increasing in areas of vital interest to the United States, the Soviet Union, or both,. These

areas include the Persian Gulf, Central America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe.

These factors increase the likelihood of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and increase the necessity for having an effective strategy for deterring Soviet actions that might make war more likely; of avoiding U.S. actions that would have the same effect without compensating gain for U.S. interests, and of heightening the readiness of U.S. forces to fight a war at all levels and win.

6. The Soviet Union is not the only conceivable source of threats to American vital interests. Other governments or groups can threaten U.S. vital interests by:

- Direct attack such as a guerrilla force shooting rockets at ships going through the Panama Canal, or Iranian fundamentalists on Saudi oil facilities, whether or not it had any affiliation with or support from the Soviet Union.

- Some governments in the world are partial to the Soviets; others are partial to the U.S and Allies. A change in power between these two groups would have implications for U.S. security, even if the Soviet Union had not planned a significant role in bringing that shift about. Coups d'etat in Saudi Arabia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East or Africa could endanger U.S. and Allied interests.

- Local conflicts and instability in the Third World can create opportunities for the direct expansion of Soviet or Soviet-proxy military influence and presence.

7. The experiences of Korea and Vietnam make clear the most significant limit on U.S. Military action in regional conflicts is the limit of time. The American people simply will not permit its government to engage in long, drawn-out military actions to defeat distant interests and achieve goals which they do not understand.

8. The key elements in American security posture--from 1815 to the 1970's--were geographic isolation, industrial capacity, and technological superiority. Distance has been obliterated. Individual capacity can be only marginally relevant to conflicts because of the time needed to gear-up to support the conflict. Nuclear superiority has been replaced by, at best, nuclear parity and perhaps even nuclear inferiority, while the overall power of our principal rival has increased steadily over the past 15 years.

o Because of these trends and conditions, the U.S. and its Allies require something besides more dollars, more men, and more weapons. The (U.S.-Allies) need new strategic ideas and an entirely new emphasis on national security strategy encompassing not only the military factor but economic, political, sci-technological, and socio-cultural factors as well. In the past, the security of the United States rested primarily on the

superiority in physical factors. In the future, it will have to rest increasingly on skill and creativity of strategic insight--on the ability to outwit its opponents instead of simply outproducing and outdeveloping them.

o That the process of model for the development of national security strategy proposed:

1. Adapts to goals or interests of the nation and is not "system" dependent. That is, not necessarily dependent on an existing budgetary process although in concert with it.

2. Allows for the recognition of goals and interests which transcend political change yet allows for the political process to prescribe steps and means which reflect the democratic will of the people.

3. Displays all the factors of national power in contention for the same goal or interest--on the same plane--offering the capability of assessing risks, impact and implications in a more logical and concrete manner.

o The level of implementation for the proposed process or model be--the National Security Council.

E

T A B E

RECOMMENDATIONS

o That the process or model prepared for the development of national security strategy be presented to the National Security Council, and the departments of the U.S. Government as a first-cut effort in the attempt to develop a national security strategy which will improve the odds of winning the contest with our principal adversary--Marxist/Leninism.

o That the proposed model be used by the Army War College as an instrument for student development of goals and interests with supporting strategy applying all factors of power.

- Include in the the FY 84 curriculum.

- A minimum of two Army War College students be assigned to develop a specific strategy per agreed national goal, using the model proposed.

- Encourage multi-service and multi-agency representation on any group project involving the proposed model.

F

T A B F

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